

Participation of political forces in parliamentary elections and national development of the Czech Republic

The author argues that Central-Eastern European countries after quitting the system of socialism show more divergences than traits in common. At the first free elections communist parties failed and then a “left wave” came. In the second half of the 90s the country experienced a “right wave”. And the situation in the Czech Republic was different. The status of the “left” party in the Czech Republic was unchangeable, extreme or moderate. At the elections it got a little number of votes, but during all post-communist years it enters the parliament. Other political parliamentary parties in the Czech Republic delimit themselves from the CPBM (The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) and quite reluctantly cooperate with communists.

Keywords: Central-Eastern Europe, the Czech Republic, Czech “left”, social-democrats, communists, parties, elections, parliament, governance.

УЧАСТЬ ПОЛІТИЧНИХ СИЛ ЧЕХІЇ В ПАРЛАМЕНТСЬКИХ ВИБОРАХ І РОЗВИТКУ ДЕРЖАВИ

Автор статті доводить, що країни Центрально-Східної Європи після виходу з системи соціалізму демонструють більше відмінностей, ніж спільного. На перших вільних виборах комуністичні партії тут зазнали поразки, а далі настала «ліва хвиля». У другій половині 90-х рр. пройшла «права хвиля». У Чехії ситуація була іншою. Положення «лівої» партії в Чехії залишилися незмінним, крайнім чи поміркованим. На виборах вона збирає невелику кількість голосів, але впродовж всіх посткомуністичних років постійно проходить до парламенту держави. Інші політичні парламентські партії Чехії відмежовуються від КПЧМ, неохоче йдуть на співпрацю з комуністами.

Ключові слова: Центрально-Східна Європа, Чехія, чеські «ліві», соціал-демократи, комуністи, партії, вибори, парламент, управління.

Postwar development of Eastern-European countries under the authority of the USSR took a heavy toll on them, as the consequences were rather considerable even after the collapse of the “real socialism”. Notwithstanding the fact that throughout their modern development CEE countries have had plenty of differences, which have been distinctly revealed since the beginning of the Euro-integration process and in the course of their membership in the European

Union, they have much in common as well and it should not be neglected. CEE countries have experienced many historical and political events what represent their common pattern, though each of the countries is self-sufficient and their specific nature provokes profound interest among researchers. However, the Czech Republic is the most unique among them. The transformations, which took place in the country in 1989 after the “Velvet Revolution”, are still in progress not only at the political level, but also in all spheres of the society. First of all, it is clearly noticeable in the processes of democratization of the political system, where multiplicity of parties became the norm of political life, important component of activity and development of various political institutions, which are fundamentally new for the Czech Republic etc.

Thus, from the point of view of general political processes in CEE the Czech Republic is of significant interest. After the “Velvet Revolution” in 1989 and till the mid-1998 in the state the power was in hands and within the competence of the “right forces”, represented by two politicians – Vaclav Havel and Vaclav Klaus. Only the last elections of the 20th century, which took place in June 19-20, 1998 changed the picture and gave a possibility for moderate “left” forces headed by social-democrat Milos Zeman to come into power. However, “left” politicians not only took over the government far late, but the governance process, initiated by them, was quite different from other processes in the region. The processes in CEE both similar and divergent are of great interest, as the way experienced by the Czech Republic can become an example for other countries.

Almost simultaneously all countries of the region observed failures of former ruling (communist) parties in the course of the revolutions in 1989 and at the first parliamentary elections, then, however, an unexpected “left wave” swept over nearly all CEE countries and in the second half of the 90s took place the second now “right wave”, which changed the situation in Lithuania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary in all post-communist countries in general. Studying the experience of the parliamentary elections in CEE countries is of great significance for their further development, as the elections there take place quite often and citizens show their preference to one or another political force, their program, strategy of further development of the state etc. and namely this actualizes the problem.

The aim of the current paper is to analyze participation of left-wing oriented political forces in the parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic and their influence on the development of the country over the last decades.

The problems of the electoral system and electoral process development have been studied by many Ukrainian and foreign scholars, like V. Burdiak, E. Valeva, H. Holosov, M. Duverger, H. Zelenko, E. Zadorozhniuk, Ye. Kish, S. Kalchenko, S. Kyselov, N. Korovitsyna, S. Lipset, O. Maiorova, I. Kresina, V. Marina, A. Meleshevyh, K. Nikiforov, Yu. Novopashyn, S. Rokkan, A. Romaniuk, F. Rudyh, G. Sartori, Ye. Shapoval and others.

In the process of study it is important to determine how the Czech Republic, which was created on January 1, 1993, after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia (into the Czech Republic

and Slovakia) managed to avoid a “left wave”. We assume that the main reasons lie in the dissolution of the Czechoslovakia Republic, which existed for 75 years as well as in peculiar historical traditions of the country¹. The dissolution played a significant role in further development of the Czech Republic, when it preferred independent development. Having pulled away from economic problems of Slovakia, the Czech Republic became self-sufficient, with developed economy and population of western-European mentality headed to Europe.

In its activity the Czech Republic clearly showed national egoism, as in the process of approaching to the European Union it tried to preserve its privileged position, delimiting itself from the neighbors. In that manner many famous declarations were made by Czechoslovakian and since 1993 Czech president Vaclav Havel². The Czech Republic has always been standing apart from other more or less similar CEE countries. In the far 19th century in the course of the national-liberation movement the Czechs preferred the so-called “natural activity” within the frames of the Austrian constitution, on the contrary to organization of armed revolutions, as the Poles did or creation of secret organization as the southern Slavs did. The First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938) also differed from the neighboring states being in the 30s of the 20th century the only country in Eastern Europe, where the democracy did not submit to authoritarian or totalitarian political systems which predominated in the neighboring countries.

After the WW2 parliamentarism in the Czech Republic maintained desperate resistance up to February 1948, trying to separate itself from the Stalin political model. Czechoslovakia was the last out-post of democracy in Eastern Europe, while the other countries were establishing the regime of “people’s democracy”, unless in September 1947 the Communist Information Bureau was created. During the period of destalinization after 1953 Czechoslovakia preferred evolutionary, economic mechanisms of changes, which preserved the country from disturbances in 1956 (as it happened in the neighboring Hungary), and in the second part of the 60s provoked the first in the region attempt to conduct a revolution of state political regime towards the “socialism with a human face”³. This attempt was tragically stopped by intervention of forces by five state-members of the Warsaw Pact, which started in August 21, 1968⁴ and this heralded a beginning of the end of socialism in Europe. Eventually, 20 years after the unsuccessful attempt of Czechoslovakia to “humanize” the socialist system the similar step was taken by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev. But the reforms offered by him were inadequate to the realias of development of socialist countries and lifestyle of their citizens and also they were commenced too late. This attempt also failed.

¹ Готовска Т. 1993 – *Чехословакизмът кръстотопът* // Международни отношения. 1995. Кн. 5-6. С. 77.

² Havel V. *Boj proti korupci – Hlavním úkolem české vlády a společnosti* // Právo. 2002. 27 unora; Havel V. *Český úděl?* // Literární noviny. 2007. № 52. S. 19-21; Havel V. *Na tema opozice* // Literární listy. Praha. 1968. Č. 6. S. 4-7; Havel V. *Open letters: selected writings 1964-1990* / selected and edited by P. Wilson. New York: Knopf, 1991. 415 p.; Fiala P. *Komunismus v České republice: vývojové, systémové a ideové aspekty působení KSČM a dalších komunistických* / P. Fiala, J. Holzer, M. Mares, P. Pseja. Brno: Masaryk University, 1999. 315 s.; Готовска Т. Същата. «Нежният развод» – развод по сметка // Международни отношения. 1998. Кн. 1. С. 41.

³ Dubcek A. *Nadeje umíra poslední: vlastní životopis*. Praha: Nakladatelství Svoboda-Libertas, 1993. S. 108.

⁴ Басва И. България и Пражката пролет 1968 г. // Политически изследвания. 1993. Кн. 1. С. 85.

“Real socialism” could not be reformed anymore; despite all pains and efforts to “bring it back to life” it collapsed.

In autumn 1989 during the period of East-European revolutions, in the country appeared its own term the “Velvet Revolution”, by which they meant profound transformations, conducted by peaceful means. Thus, at that time it was possible to speak of violent political changes in case of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, as in Poland and Hungary this transition was elaborated and conducted by the leaders of that time communist parties – the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP). Czechoslovakian “Velvet Revolution” extended the regime of M. Jakes, having transformed the dissident movement “Charter 77” into a mass movement the “Civil Forum” in Prague and the “Society against violence” in Slovakia, ensuring a smooth transition of power from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) to the newly-created political institutions⁵.

Transition in Czechoslovakia started with negotiations (Round Table), but everything happened quite rapidly. The process was simplified by resignations of ministers and deputies, who left the CPC organization, became non-party and supported new political forces. The most representative example was shown by prime-minister M. Calfa, who deserted his post, left the CPC and being non-party formed first transitional government. That time communist parliamentary majority adopted democratic changes to the Constitution⁶, which, in fact, opened the door for new political forces to victory at the first free and democratic elections, which took place on June 8-9, 1990. At the elections throughout the country the ruling Communist Party absolutely failed, gaining the support of 13% of voters⁷.

Over the first months and years of the transformational period the divergences between the CPC and other communist parties of the region were defined. While all other left-wing oriented parties were urgently looking for a way-out from such unanticipated and sharp changes, like the PUWP in Poland and the HSWP in Hungary, which at first voluntarily dissolved and then declared about their creation or as the Bulgarian Communist Party, which rejected its previous name and changed it into a new one – the Bulgarian Socialist party, the CPC was strictly preserving its identity. By all means, it had to change a large number of its program positions, take new democratic order and ideas of democratic socialism, but the party managed to preserve maybe the most important thing – succession from the CPC, taking its new name – the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (CPBM).

Conservatism of the CPC was not occasional. It was formed as a result of changes, which took place in the state, after the intervention of the Soviet troops into the CzSSR in August 1968. Interference of the USSR into the domestic situation of Czechoslovakia was not only

⁵ Ash T.G. *The Magic Lantern. The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague*. New York: Random House, 1990. P. 29.

⁶ Judt T.R. *Metamorphosis: The Democratic Revolution in Czechoslovakia. Eastern Europe in Revolution* / Ed. by I. Banac. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. P. 102.

⁷ Wheaton B., Kavan Z. *The Velvet Revolution. Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991* // West-view Press. 1992. P. 150.

military, but first of all political. It caused profound transformations in the CPC – deprivation of not only Alexander Dubcek, but also other reformists from power, mass purges of the party and all important state institutions, both political and cultural⁸. Such purge was called “normalization”, conducted by a new leader of the CPC Husav Husak assisted by the head of the controlling commission M. Jakes⁹.

And at that time the CPC returned to neo-Stalinism times. Thus, when at the end of 1989 changes became unavoidable, the CPC did not possess reformative potential, which could execute factual transformation. A newly created organization – the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia was doomed to become reserve for traditional communists, as it had changed only to the extent it was required by the new conditions. The CPBM contained almost 10% of population, those nostalgically inclined Czechs, who bore social burden from one year to another over the whole period of changes. Here also belonged repressive “official screening” laws of the “right” government¹⁰, which created the CPBM an image of persecuted and provided them with a constant place in the parliament and the role of the extreme “left” opposition.

Absence of reformatory Communist Party created in the Czech Republic unique chances for social-democracy. In each country of the region, after the first, initial euphoria of popularity, social-democracy, which was prohibited till 1989, could not hold its political grounds as a real force in the political process. Anticommunism of old social-democracy was attractive just for several months, while factually “right” anti-communist formations were created, which later absorbed social-democrats – anticommunists, while really “left” parties chose rather to stay in an organized and experienced reformatory left-wing, which embodied post-communist parties in Eastern Europe¹¹.

However, in the Czech Republic “left” and democratically thinking people should not be identified with those CPBM members, who were expelled from the party in the early 70s and during the period of transformation established a new social-democratic party. It preserved its popularity in the Czech society by the fact that among its members was a significant leader of the “Prague Spring” A. Dubcek (being a social-democrat he headed new National assembly till tragic death in 1993). Due to former communists, reformers from the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSDP), for instance leader of the party M. Zeman, could not only hold their place in a tight space between an extreme right heel and new formations, conservative “left” neo-communists, but also become a unique moderate and serious parliamentary opposition, which continually tried to create an alternative to the “right” government, headed by V. Klaus. This is one of the reasons of the absence of a “left wave” in the Czech Republic, strong reformatory post-communist party and dissipation of “left” forces between two parties – the CPBM

⁸ Dubcek A. *Nadeje umira posledni: vlastni životopis*. Praha: Nakladatelství Svoboda-Libertas, 1993. S. 203.

⁹ Mlynar Z. *Night frost in Prague. The End of Humane Socialism*. N. Y.: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 1980. P.47.

¹⁰ *The Screening Act: Anti-Communist or Anti-Democratic?* // East European Reporter. 1992. Vol. 5. № 1. P. 94.

¹¹ Fedorchak T.P. *Osnovni napravany dialnosti Chekhoslovatskoi sotsial-demokratychnoi partii u period transformatsii suspilstva* // Politolohichni i sotsiolohichni studii. Zb. Naukovykh prats. Vol. II. Chernivtsi: Prut, 2002. P. 219.

and the CSDP, which were rather delimited in the epoch of “normalization”, when one were persecuted and others “purged”.

Second no less important reason for constant governance of “right” forces is in organizing capabilities of the “right”. At the first election won the “Civil Forum” headed by V. Havel, who became the first post-communist president (succeeded H. Husak at this post in December 1989), created the first absolutely non-communist government headed by V. Klaus. However, after first successes V. Klaus’ desire to transform amorphous civil formation into a real “right” political party led to a breakdown within the Civil Forum as well as political competitiveness between two leading politicians¹². The conflict corresponded with the time and this revealed in other CEE countries, in particular in a big oppositional coalition “Solidarity” in Poland, the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria etc., which broke down under the pressure of multi-directional interests, which were united around the idea of anticommunism. When a strong enemy – the communist party disappeared, the coalition started to flame out and appeared numerous multi-party political systems.

In the Czech Republic there always were contradictions between the intellectuals, dissidents, who supported president V. Havel and pragmatic technocrats, backing up V. Klaus. There were formed two points of view – moral-ethical position for “life in the truth”, which was extremely significant in the times of opposition to the non-democratic system¹³ and the position of new politicians, who supposed successes in governance to be the most important goal and who till 1989 were silent and endured violation of the system, and when great changes took place started their activity. In the Czech Republic as well as in other post-communist countries pragmatists took the upper hand in all contradictions. V. Havel had minimal powers, but remained the president till the time when the Civil Democratic Party (CDP), formed by V. Klaus on the basis of the Civil Forum won the 1992 elections and ensured themselves the post of the prime-minister.

V. Klaus managed to avoid social dissatisfaction in the course of transformation and at the same time prevented a “left wave” in the politics. In fact it was an incontestable achievement of V. Klaus’ governance. His pragmatism made V. Klaus reject such radical measures as “shocking therapy”, implemented by L. Balcerowicz in Poland. In accordance with M. Thatcher’s statement the most successful model of the post-communist development of economics was implemented and the architect of the model was “the best minister of finance in Europe” – prime-minister of the Czech Republic V. Klaus¹⁴. Being economist by education V. Klaus till 1989 worked in the Economic Institute of the Czechoslovakian Academy of Science and was a dedicated follower of monetarism, but as a politician, he did not act in correspondence with the theory

¹² Mrklas L. *Koncept stranických rodin a české politické strany (nejen) po listopadu 1989* // II. kongres českých politologů: Praha-Suchdol, 09.2003. Praha: ČSPV, 2003. S. 279.

¹³ Басва И. Днешните проекции на делото на първия президент на Чехословакия Томаш Г. Масарик // Ново време. 1997. Кн. 5. С. 115.

¹⁴ Kriukov E. *Kompromatnyi zalp po Cbebiu* // *Rossia i mir*. 1997. № 52. P. 32.

he supported, but in line with the practice of management, which he tried to develop. To act in conformity with realias and not ideal desires was a rare quality among politicians in Central-Eastern European countries, but it was typical of the Czech history.

The Czech Republic inherited from Czechoslovakia a powerful and well-organized trade-union movement, wealthy society, which traditionally kept to their privileges and conveniences. This reality made V. Klaus start the transformation, which differed from an absolutely “right” one, taken in the neighboring countries by the “Solidarity” or the Hungarian Democratic Forum. He implemented a right-of-center transformation, which focused on the introduction of market mechanisms while preserving, if possible, social achievements and big agricultural economies, which were developing on the basis of a legal return or restitution of property rights, without division of agricultural cooperatives, but by means of returning compensations to the owners, denationalization by means of mass privatization¹⁵.

Quite interesting was “right” policy of V. Klaus, which was distinctly represented in political grounds for newly adopted laws. The Czech Republic was the first country, which adopted the Act on “Screening of officials” – rejecting everything connected with the CPC. On the contrary to the protests of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, numerous non-party citizens and international human rights groups, “screening” acts were implemented in the life of the Czech Republic¹⁶. The opposition in the civil life of the Czech Republic concerning the new law was understandable, as after the purge and events of 1968 in the Czech Republic when during the period of “normalization” all “politically unreliable people” were put aside, since this method, which was already known for the Czechs, could not but cause profound civil protest. “Right” and foreign policy of the country, which led the Czech Republic to withdrawal from the East-European structures (the Warsaw Pact was annulled in July 1, 1991 in Prague), rapidly reoriented to the EU and NATO.

However, pragmatic governance, even regardless of V. Klaus’ ability to adhere to the accustomed course of events, did not save the society from the political problems. It should be stated that establishing of the Czech Republic was accompanied by enhancement of parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary pluralism, effective electoral system gave an opportunity by democratic means to form legislative and executive government authorities at all levels. In May-June 1996 in the country took place the parliamentary elections, at which 5% barrier was overcome by the CDP, the Czech Social-Democratic Party (CSDP), the Civil Democratic Alliance (CDA) the Christian Democratic Union – the Czech People’s Party (CDU-CPP) the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (CPBM), the Republican Party (RP). The parties of the ruling coalition (CDP, CDA, CDU-CPP) gained 99 places out of 200 and formed the government of the parliamentary minority, headed again by V. Klaus, whereas the position of

¹⁵ Mareš M. *Czech Militant Democracy in Action: Dissolution of the Workers’ Party and the Wider Context of This Act* // East European Politics and Societies. 2012. Vol. 26. №. 1. P. 39.

¹⁶ Linek L., Mansfeldova Z. *The Parliament of the Czech Republic, 1993–2004* // The Journal of Legislative Studies. 2007. Vol. 13. № 1. P. 17.

the speaker of parliament was taken by the leader of social-democrats M. Zeman. But in order to form a new government V. Klaus had to turn for help to the Christian-Democratic Union, headed by J. Luks.

At the end of that year the Czech Republic faced economic problems – the banking system was under threat of bankruptcy, production rates decreased and at the end of 1997 the government had to depreciate national currency by 10%. The attempts to start “tightening belts” failed. In November 1997 revelation of frauds, concerning the assignments to the electoral fund of the CDP conducted the governmental crisis¹⁷.

That was the time of V. Havel. He took advantage of illegal funding of the CDP by the Christian Democratic Union and together with the opponents of V. Klaus, from his own CDP, forced the latter to resign, what happened in November 30, 1997. A new government of parliamentary majority was headed by a former head of the National Bank J. Tosovsky. It started a prolonged political crisis in the Czech Republic, which led to pre-term parliamentary elections in June 1998¹⁸.

In January 1998, V. Havel was elected President for the second time. Finally, in 1998 political changes were commenced in the Czech Republic. According to all sociological surveys since 1997 the CSDP became a leading party which headed all “right” parties that offered the Czechs protection from the social state, affordable education and healthcare, fight against corruption, stimulation of the Czech national entrepreneurs, and state care over providing new employment opportunities, especially provision of public amenities. The CSDP ideas corresponded with the principles of the European social-democracy and consequently they won the majority.

At the 1998 pre-term parliamentary elections the CSDP won, however as at the previous elections its majority was relative – 32.3% and just 74 deputies out of 200. The biggest surprise of the elections was positive results for CDP, headed by V. Klaus. The party won the second place with 27.7% of votes and 63 deputies. The election observers expected that they would lose their enthusiasm and activity after charge of corruption in February 1998, when the former minister of interior affairs I. Ruml left the CDP with his adherents and formed the Freedom Union (FU). However, V. Klaus as a real politician could organize and conduct exclusively tough election campaign and returned a large part of their followers.

Other political forces gained the following results: the third place got the CPBM with 11% of votes and 24 deputies correspondingly; the fourth place got the Christian-Democratic Union, headed by J. Luks (9% of votes and 20 deputies); the fifth place belonged to the FU (8.6% of votes and 19 deputies). However, such a big number of political parties which entered the parliament did not give much hope to overcome the political crisis. Two “left” parties – the CSDP and the CPBM did not gain the absolute majority and M. Zeman was strongly against

¹⁷ Linek L., Outly J. *Czech Republic: Is it Possible to Buy Political Stability?* // Roper S. Public Finance and Post-Communist Party Development / Steven D. Roper, Janis Ikstens. Ashgate: Aldershot and Burlington, 2008. P. 77-94.

¹⁸ Kysloušek J. *ODS a její vnitřní fungování* // Balík S. Občanská demokratická strana a česká politika: ODS v českém politickém systému v letech 1991–2006. Brno: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2006. S. 248-249.

any kind of cooperation with communists. “Right-wing” parties could not form the parliamentary majority as well, taking into account recent past, when J. Luks and I. Ruml, just half a year before the elections helped to pull down V. Klaus¹⁹.

It seemed that the situation was in a deadlock unless in July 9, 1998 two leading parties achieved sudden mutual understanding. It was rather strange as the CSDP and CDP were furiously fighting with each other during the election campaign – the CSDP accused the CDP of lowering standards of living, whereas the CDP threatened the voters with “return to communism” if the CSDP won the elections. However, after prolonged and worthless search for coalitional allies the leader of the CSDP M. Zeman and the head of the CDP V. Klaus managed to overcome their mutual negative feelings, reached an agreement, and made an unprecedented deal in the history of the Czech and European parliamentarianism – signed Stabilization agreement. The parties shared the posts.

V. Klaus promised to support the government of minority, if it was formed by the CSDP and even promised not to vote for its non-confidence. In his turn, M. Zeman gave his word to appoint V. Klaus the head of the parliament and give his power the most important economic missions. Eventually, it happened so – V. Klaus became the speaker of the parliament, while the government was formed by the CSDP and its leader M. Zeman became the prime-minister. The new government carried on the attempts of the predecessors, aimed at economic growth and “return” to Europe, started harmonization of the Czech legislation in accordance with the norms and rules of the EU²⁰.

Concerns as to such peculiar broad coalition were expressed by President V. Havel and leaders of “right” parties, but at that time such decision was the only one, which could help avoid new pre-term parliamentary elections. We assume that another important question which played a significant role was how it is possible to form the “left” government of minority, when the elections absolutely relied on the votes of the “right” deputies?

Nevertheless, at that period, 9 years since the transformation changes started, “left” political forces in the Czech Republic got an opportunity to show how it was possible to carry out socially-oriented transformation to democracy and market economy. Though, anticipations that these intentions could be actualized were minimal. The government, headed by M. Zeman did not have an essential majority, and it meant that even if it was not resigned by voting non-confidence in it (with the support of V. Klaus), then this government would have enough time to adopt in the parliament all required laws, which were aimed at changing the economic model, inherited from “right” parties.

These were the election promises of the CSDP. When his governmental team came to power M. Zeman by all means and absolutely delimited himself from even silent support of

¹⁹ Krejčí O. *Nová kniha o volbách*. Praha: Professional Publishing, 2006. S. 117.

²⁰ Kopecky P, Mudde C. *The 1998 parliamentary and Senate elections in the Czech Republic* // Electoral Studies. 1998. Vol. 18. №. 3. P. 415-424.

the CPBM, the party which despite its third place at the elections was not even invited to the meeting of president V. Havel with the parliamentary parties. Ideological convictions of the past continued limiting the possibilities of “left” parties to adhere to the pragmatic position, though monetarists of V. Klaus continuously showed in practice that in case of complicated political situations they could not be restrained either by Zeman’s “left” platform or any keen social accusations.

Thus, we may conclude that in the course of the first decade after transformational changes, the position of the “left” party remained the same, extreme or moderate, it was not engaged into governance at the level of parliamentary commissions, not to reveal itself and prove that had already overcome own past, contradictions, for which others paid and were still paying. Other political parties of the Czech Republic reluctantly cooperated with the CPBM. These speculations are supported by the results of the survey, conducted in the Czech Republic in February 2011²¹, when for abolishing of the communist party were 50.1% of respondents, against – 40%. As Radio Praha informed, abolishment of the communist party in the Czech Republic first of all would be approved by the citizens between 30-40 and elder people. At the same time, a special group by the Ministry of inferior affairs of the Czech Republic in the mid-February 2011 started preparation of normative documents as to probable abolishment of the CPBM. The initiative, concerning abolishment of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia was announced by the ruling Civil Democratic Party. However, the initiative was not supported by other parties and the CPBM is still functioning in the Czech society and parliament: in 2010 it gained 11,27% of votes and 26 deputies, at the 2013 parliamentary elections it got 14,91% of votes and 33 deputies correspondingly and at the last elections which took place in October 20-21, 2017 it gained 7,8% of votes and 15 deputies correspondingly.

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²¹ *In the Czech Republic a half of population is for liquidation of the Communist Party*. URL: <http://news.finance.ua/ua/~1/0/all/2011/02/27/229395> (accessed date: 20.10.2017).

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